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The concept of “green governmentality” is something that Foucault — whose back was de-
cidedly turned away from nature1 — would have never envisioned. Studies of green gov-
ernmentality first appeared in the mid 1990s and have continued to appear at a steady pace 
since then.2 Stephanie Rutherford’s Governing the Wild: Ecotours of Power is the first mono-
graph to analyze green governmentality, with case studies of the American Museum of 
Natural History (AMNH), Disney’s Animal Kingdom, ecotours at Yellowstone and Grand 
Teton National Parks, and Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth.  
Rutherford eschews the genealogical method that is typical of governmentality stud-
ies in favor of a “strict Foucauldian view of discourse analysis” (183). The privileging of 
discourse becomes evident in the stated aim of the book, which is to critique the regime of 
truth linked to green governmentality. Discourse analysis helps Rutherford find the “un-
derlying narratives” (xxiv) in the different case studies, and she discerns two inter-related 
themes common to them all. First, scientific authority is invoked in the framing of environ-
mental issues, with uncontrolled population growth and wasteful consumption practices 
routinely identified as key contributing factors. Second, the range of solutions offered in all 
the cases remains limited to transforming consumer choices, implementing policy changes, 
and/or deploying technological fixes (165). The central thrust of Rutherford’s critique con-
sists in pointing out the notable absences in this truth regime: “So, for example, the kind of 
environmental justice work that pays attention to the intersections of race, class, gender, 
and nature is not present. Nor is a sustained critique of industrial capitalism and its effects 
on nature” (86, see also 95, 135). Further, neither the AMNH, Disney, ecotour operators, nor 
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Al Gore “take apart the neoliberal order that both creates and increasingly commodifies en-
vironmental problems” (81). Like some of the other concepts invoked in the book (e.g., 
Baudrillard’s “simulacra” and “hyperreal,” Latour’s “immutable mobiles” and “rituals of 
purification”), an explication of capitalism and neo-liberalism are never provided to the 
reader. Nevertheless, given the limitations found in the narratives she examines, Rutherford 
remains convinced that, “although there is never one truth, there are better stories to tell” 
(182). 
Before proceeding to address her search for these alternate narratives, this review 
will further unpack the contents of the discourse analysis, one which does not approach 
green governmentality as a monolithic entity (195). Instead, there are four “kinds” of green 
governmentality: scientific, corporate, aesthetic, and ethical. On the basis of this attention to 
empirical specificity, Rutherford claims that her analytic grid surpasses “Foucault and stud-
ies that use governmentality [which] often seem to marginalize or erase difference in the 
administration of rule” (xv). 
Each case study exemplifies one particular kind of green governmentality, but all are 
present to varying degrees. The operation of scientific green governmentality is prevalent at 
the AMNH, which discursively frames nature as under threat and in need of scientific 
management (2, 20, 39). The museum is an agent of scientific green governmentality: it gov-
erns the truth of nature, circumscribing how it is understood and acted upon, without tak-
ing into account the “global structures of inequality that in large part produce ecological 
destruction” (35). The same is true of Disney’s Animal Kingdom, which ignores the struc-
tural causes of ecological catastrophe: “Not mentioned are the environmental costs of sub-
urban life, the American reliance on oil, or the complicated impacts of resources extrac-
tion...” (81). Instead, Disney sanitizes its representations of nature and non-Western cul-
tures; it offers an example of corporate green governmentality, wherein nature is commodi-
fied to be “experienced as fantasy, play, and spectacle” (44). While these findings are rather 
unsurprising, Rutherford’s analysis confirms other scholarly studies of the AMNH and 
Disney which have shown that the presumed separation between museum and theme park 
has now been more or less elided. That is, both institutions are engaged in forms of “edu-
tainment.” In order to improve visitor numbers, the AMNH has drawn upon the “tools of 
theme park culture” (13). For its part, Disney is involved in the production of knowledges 
about nature, commissioning studies as well as conducting its own research. (75) Ruther-
ford argues that Disney has become “a site where “truths” about nature are produced and 
circulated” (82, see also xxi). So, although Disney is the epitome of corporate green gov-
ernmentality, it functions on scientific registers as well. 
Aesthetic green governmentality is most prominent in the ecotours of Yellowstone 
and Grand Teton National Parks that Rutherford participated in. While the “wild” animals 
inhabiting these parks were once shot at by the guns of hunters, they are now captured by 
the cameras of eco-tourists. According to Rutherford, “green governmentality can work on 
an aesthetic register, not only governing the production of knowledge but also how we 
come to see the wilderness as beautiful and rejuvenating, and because of these characteris-
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tics, in need of human protection” (90). Once again, it is the subject-position elaborated at 
this site that serves as the main target of Rutherford’s critique. In the ecotours, consump-
tion—paying thousands of dollars to experience “pristine wilderness”—is equated with ac-
tion, which, in turn, leads to redemption (137). The environmental citizen is one who con-
sumes consciously, while more or less accepting the status quo, i.e., “neo-liberal capital-
ism.” Rutherford’s final case study serves to further reinforce this view. Al Gore’s docu-
mentary film, An Inconvenient Truth, exemplifies ethical green governmentality. Relying on 
“the impartiality and unquestioned truth of science to warn of impending global apoca-
lypse” (176), Gore then exhorts “us”—the viewer and consumer—to individual action. As 
Rutherford points out, Gore’s “recommendations offer a particular kind of subjectivity that, 
as in the previous cases elaborated in this book, largely hinges on a form of green consump-
tion” (164). Having found the limitations to the regime of truth (of American environmen-
talism), Rutherford then seeks “to think of a space outside of green governmentality” (42, 
see also xii, 138).  
The search for a space outside proves futile however. As Rutherford writes in the 
conclusion to the book: “I am sad to say that I provide no coherent answers here, no 
roadmap for change” (196). Her inability to find an escape-route from the green govern-
mentalities she diagnoses has less to do with the absence of an outside space than her selec-
tion of the case studies themselves. In the introduction, Rutherford contends that “[t]o un-
derstand the ways in which sites of consumption are important for how nature is imagined, 
deployed, and ruled, there must be traffic between notions of governmentality and com-
modification” (xviii). Leaving aside the methodological question of why governmentality 
studies have strenuously avoided the latter, Rutherford’s case studies have not only created 
traffic, but outright congestion. Because the AMNH, Disney, ecotour operators, and Al Gore 
are so heavily invested in processes of capitalist exchange, the four forms of green govern-
mentality appear inextricably linked to the commodification of nature. But are green gov-
ernmentalities restricted to sites of consumption? Could they also be operative in sites of 
production, such as co-operative farms where discourses of nature govern practices and 
shape subjectivities? Thus, there is a clear asymmetry in Rutherford’s selection of case stud-
ies, and this has consequences for her overall diagnosis. 
Indeed, for someone who has been influential in the development of green govern-
mentality studies, it is surprising that such a negative critique would be levelled. It must be 
tempered, and Stephanie Rutherford makes a number of caveats throughout the book that 
would appear to support this. For instance, she does not think that the prescriptive appeals 
to consumption choices “are inherently bad; indeed, I have incorporated many of them into 
my own life as I seek to mediate my own role in environmental destruction” (35). Nor does 
she want to come across as “dismissive” of Disney’s efforts to reduce its ecological footprint 
(80). Taken together, these examples already reveal that, perhaps, there is not such a “des-
perate need” to find a space outside of green governmentality (203). Are its various 
“agents” all reducible to functionaries and allies of neo-liberal capitalism? Even if there are 
problems with green governmentality, seeking an outside at this point seems premature, 
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especially when the only alternative suggested by Rutherford is a vague call to practice a 
“relational ethics” (197). It seems that the task at this point is less to find an outside to green 
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